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Abstract— This paper proposes the new method for improving the accuracy of detection of DDoS attacks on the SDN by utilizing 
control plane using Six-Sigma method. Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is a centralized network control system. This system 
offers flexibility on receiving, processing and forwarding packets between subnetworks. The centralized system of SDN, which 
separates control plane and data plan, has an immense number of advantages, but it also has the risk of becoming a single point of 
network failure. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is the major issues faced in the security aspect of SDN. This attack can 
make network resources unreachable by the real packets. The widely known method has been implemented on SDN for avoiding a 
DDoS attack is Three-Sigma method. Three-Sigma method uses a threshold value to determine the existence of a DDoS attack. 
However, this method has drawbacks regarding accuracy in determining the DDoS attack. The main contribution of this paper is 
utilizing central control plane of SDN for improving accuracy on detecting the DDoS attack. Several experiments performed for 
proving the concept. The result shows the new method can improve the accuracy of detection of a DDoS attack, either in constant or 
fluctuating traffic, by reducing the false positive. The performance is about 50% more accurate than the previous method. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There are several methods for avoiding DDoS attacks on 
SDN environment [1], [2], [3]. There are two level attacks, 
network, and application level attacks. Network attacks are 
usually made by flooding the network by useless packets. 
The transaction-level attack occurred by activating of 
applications that consume resources of a computer system 
[4]. In the traditional / existing Network, to innovate and 
manage the network is hard due to each device has its 
control logic and has vendor dependency. The challenge is 
how to implement new ideas in real traditional networks 
because new ideas often include nonstandard aspects. This 
shortage makes it difficult on implementing DDoS detection 
mechanism 
SDN is an approach to computer network system that uses 
software for control and manages network devices that can 
be programmed. OpenFlow is secured communication 
protocol between planes in SDN [5]. This research has 
explored the implementation of Software-Defined 
Networking (SDN) with OpenFlow protocol for detecting 
network-level attacks. 
Based on the theoretical and conceptual of the SDN and 
the statistical approach several points can be enhanced by 
the accuracy of the DDoS detection in SDN network.  In a 
traditional network, there is a limitation of DDoS detection, 
such as adding many of third-party tools in the network, 
depending on the topology. The previous method of 
detecting DDoS in SDN is using three-sigma threshold [1], 
that is too low for defined as a threshold, so while suddenly 
there is an increase of legitimate traffic it will be detected as 
a DDoS.  
The sigma or deviation can be used as detection threshold. 
The sigma is a standard deviation of the list of value. It can 
be used as a reference standard or limit, how much traffic 
may be distorted. Because sigma is the standard deviation 
value, it is not the value of traffic that will be compared with 
a standard deviation of itself, but the difference between the 
current traffic by an average of previous traffic history. The 
use of sigma for threshold can use the general equation for 
finding deviation.  
In other research, there is a method using Six-Sigma. The 
three-sigma normal distribution output falls between 99.7%. 
However, the normal distribution output of Six-Sigma is 
99.97%, this normal distribution output can be used for 
achieving extremely low false positive or negative. By 
identifying Six-Sigma as threshold values [1], we will use 
only the Upper Control Limit (UCL) value as an upper 
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threshold because the attack traffic is always expanding the 
traffic. 
The previous method just uses three of standard deviation 
threshold mechanism from 60 pool of packet flow from 
switches, which if there is a sudden increase of traffic then it 
will be detected as a DDoS attack although it is regular 
traffic. To improve the detection, we propose the 
modification of the previous method by changing the three-
sigma value to Six-Sigma value, Gupta identified that Six-
Sigma value has better accuracy and low false positive [1] in 
a DDoS attack in traditional / existing networks. This paper 
works in SDN environment which has different 
characteristic compared to traditional / existing networks. In 
this research to improve the previous method, we change the 
threshold of detection to Six-Sigma to lowering the false 
positive rate. 
II. MATERIAL AND METHOD 
A. Software-Defined Networking (SDN) 
There are various types of attack, and it can be classified 
base on the characteristics of the effect on the victim. There 
are software attack, protocol attack and bandwidth attack [6]. 
This paper focuses on traffic attack solution. 
SDN is a new concept in computer network system, it 
simplifies control of the network and enables innovation 
through the programmable network, it has a concept of 
separating the control from forwarding planes. On SDN, 
control-plane is separated on another machine called 
controller [7]. This process provides innovative network 
architecture, programmable, cost-efficient and vendor-
agnostic [8]. 
Fig. 1, (a) and (b) shows how the existing traditional 
network running specification, which is the control and the 
data planes are on the same machine. Fig. 2 shows the 
running specification of SDN OpenFlow where planes are 
separated in a different machine. 
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Fig. 1 (a) or (b) is an existing traditional network [5] 
 
 
Fig. 2  The specification of SDN OpenFlow [9] 
 
B. SDN OpenFlow 
OpenFlow is a new protocol that used by the controller to 
communicate with the switches. This protocol is an essential 
part of SDN. It controls the switches and external entity to 
arrange the flow of packets on the network. 
Every switch has ingress and egress paths data on the 
table. OpenFlow makes the controller can access these tables.  
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show the SDN architecture with 
OpenFlow protocol [10]. Fig. 5 shows OpenFlow table that 
stores 12-tuple with fields and every flow has a statistic, a 
priority, and action [4]. 
C. SDN Controller 
SDN controller is an essential device that is responsible 
for maintaining all of the network rules. It distributes proper 
instructions for the network devices. The OpenFlow 
controller is entirely responsible for handling packets [9]. 
In the traditional / existing Network, to innovate and 
manage the network is hard due to each device has its 
control logic and has vendor dependency. It is not easy to 
experiment new ideas in real traditional networks because 
new ideas often include nonstandard aspects. To break this 
limitation, SDN was introduced. SDN enabled controllers 
can control devices through a secure channel.  
 
 
Fig. 3  SDN architecture with OpenFlow protocol [10] 
 
 
Fig. 4  Simple network using OpenFlow protocol 
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 Fig. 5  OpenFlow table entry [4] 
 
Controllers instruct devices to forward packets based on 
the instructions or flow entries. Users can deploy their new 
idea on the SDN network with centralized control logic [11]. 
The controller will communicate to the data plane device 
using OpenFlow protocol. With this benefit, it is possible to 
organize OpenFlow Switches [2].  
D. Available Methods for Detecting DDoS 
There are several methods related to DDoS detection that 
is based on traffic anomaly. The DDoS detection on traffic 
anomaly that commonly used is based on statistical approach 
likewise the use of standard deviation and entropy.  
The standard deviation could be used for divining a 
threshold for DDoS detection; there are several researches of 
using standard deviation as a DDoS detection threshold. The 
standard deviation itself sometimes called sigma, referring to 
the standard deviation symbol (σ). 
1. Three-sigma on SDN network: There are some methods 
on using OpenFlow for detecting malicious activity [12]. It 
functions to inspect certain traffic classes [13]. The previous 
method using three-sigma deviation from 60 pool of packet 
flow from switches, which suddenly there is an increase of 
traffic that the range is still reasonable from normal behavior, 
it will be detected as a DDoS, whether it is normal traffic. 
After 60 pooling T60port stats from the switch, the value of 
the 3sigma and the mean (μ) are calculated, the three-sigma 
(3σ) will be defined as a threshold, and the mean value will 
be kept as for next process. When the 61st (TN) traffic 
pooled, it will subtract with the previous mean (μ) value, the 
result of subtraction will be compared to the 3σ, if it is 
higher than the 3σ, is known as an attack. The equation can 
represent this concept. 
 
 Attack  (TN-μ(T60)) > (3σ(T60))     (1) 
 
2. Six-Sigma: Six-Sigma, is six standard deviations from the 
mean, the plan is proposed by Motorola to address quality 
issue what's more, business change. Six-Sigma signifies an 
efficient, creative movement to factually gauge and 
investigate reasons for deformities that happen in all parts of 
the administration, and at that point evacuate those causes by 
distinguishing proof of limits of the critical measurements 
which are measured. Six-Sigma asserts that concentrating on 
the diminishment of variety will settle process. By utilizing 
an arrangement of factual instruments to comprehend the 
variance of a procedure, the administration can start to 
foresee the normal result of that procedure. [1]. In other 
research, there is a method using Six-Sigma for DDoS 
detection in the traditional network. The standard deviation 
obtained from traffic flow will be multiplied by six and then 
add or subtract the result for calculating the mean value.  
 
 UCL = μ + 6σ    (2) 
 
In equations formula 3, UCL is a method that uses the 
upper limit control mechanism as the threshold. However, by 
using the mean plus Six-Sigma, there is a potential that the 
threshold is too high. Because the sigma is a deviation, so 
the difference of the mean should compare it. Also, there is 
no literature showing the use of Six-Sigma on SDN network. 
Table 1 shows the difference between two methods. 
TABLE I 
DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN TWO METHODS 
Method Used in SDN Normally Distributed Output 
Three-sigma Yes 99.7% 
Six-Sigma No 99.97% 
 
The three-sigma, have a normally distributed output of 
99.7%. Otherwise, Six-Sigma have the normally distributed 
output is 99.97% [1], this normally distributed output can be 
used for achieving extremely low false positive, this method 
used in the traditional network. On the other hand, there is 
the use of standard deviation as DDoS detecting threshold in 
SDN, but it just used the three-sigma.  
E. Method for the Proposed System 
We have proposed the new scheme using Six-Sigma 
because the three-sigma normally distributed output fall 
between 99.7%. Otherwise, Six-Sigma have the normally 
distributed output is 99.97% [1], this normally distributed 
output can be used for achieving extremely low false 
positive, by identifying Six-Sigma as threshold values [1] we 
will use only the UCL value as an upper threshold because 
the attack traffic always up warding the traffic.  
In comparing mechanism, we choose the previous method 
comparing subtracted the “now traffic” with the mean of 60 
pool of traffic, and compare it with the standard deviation 
that multiplies by 6 (Six-Sigma) for defining a threshold. 
The Six-Sigma is a deviation, so it should be comparing it 
with the difference value between the “now traffic” and the 
mean. If the value of “now traffic” minus the mean of 60 
pools is higher than the Six-Sigma, it considered as DDoS. 
Base on the benefit of that method. The standard deviation 
we get from the traffic flow will be multiplied by 6. 
 
 Attack  (TN-μ(T60)) > (6σ(T60))   (3) 
 
After 60 pooling T60port stats from the switch, the value 
of the 6sigma and the mean (μ) are calculated, the 6sigma 
(6σ) will be defined as a threshold, and the mean value will 
be kept as for next process. When the 61st (TN) traffic 
pooled, it will subtract with the previous mean (μ) value, the 
result of subtraction will be compared to the 6σ, if it is 
higher than the 6σ, it is known as an attack. The comparison 
between the previous and the improvement methods is 
described in Fig. 6. While Fig. 7 shows the flowchart of a 
proposed method.  
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 Fig. 6  Method comparison 
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Fig. 7  Flowchart of designed method 
 
We proposed the combination of above previous methods, 
changing the three-sigma from the SDN base DDoS 
Detection with the Six-Sigma from the traditional network. 
Fig. 7 shows the complete flowchart of the system as follows: 
  
1) Read Port Statistics: The flow statistics pooled to the 
controller from the port of the switch, each eth port of the 
host will pool to the controller. 
 
2) Send Statistics to a Bucket of Array: Every port 
statistics from the switch will be inserted into a bucket of the 
array that has size 60 if exceeded, the first entry value of the 
Bucket of the array will be deleted. 
 
3) Define Threshold: Calculate the threshold of Six-Sigma 
from the 60 value of a bucket of the array. 
 
4) Triggered by Attack: If the new entry (TN) subtracted 
with the mean of a bucket of the array is larger than Six-
Sigma of the bucket of the array, then the TN  
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
This section describes the detailed scenario that we used 
to the experiment. The detail of the scenarios is explained 
below. The experiment has been performed using simulation 
software tools Mininet framework, with the following 
network elements: 1 OpenFlow controller (Ryu Controller), 
1 OVS Switch (OpenFlow switch), 2 Host, 1 host as an 
attacker and another host with normal traffic and 1 host as a 
victim. The topology of the simulation network that is used 
in this research can be shown in Fig. 8. 
 
OpenFlow Switch
Host A Host CHost B
Ryu Controller
 
Fig. 8  Topology scenario of simulation 
 
The network topology in this scenario is using 3 hosts 
such as Host 1, Host 2 and Host 3, 1 OpenFlow Switch, and 
1 Controller. Host 2 will act as an attacker, Host 3 as a 
regular user and Host 1 as a victim. At the first time, Host 3 
will send a normal packet to Host 1 and then Host 2 and 3 
will send attack packet to Host 1. Ryu controller is selected 
because it provides distinct API software components. In 
this experiment, there are two scenarios with representing 
traffic in Telkom Corp. network to simulate normal traffic 
with sudden change and DDoS attack traffic. After analysis 
the Telkom Corp. Mean Router Traffic Gateway (MRTG); it 
is found that there is two type of traffic in Telkom network, 
uniform, and un-uniform. 
A. Scenario 1 
This scenario will test how both methods, previous 
method, and improved method, to detect normal traffic with 
a suddenly increased traffic, in unflat condition. The attacker 
sends 20M and the maximum legitimate traffic set to 6M. 
We choose the 6M value from the highest traffic value 5M 
added by 1M, just in case if there is an increase in traffic that 
exceeds the maximum traffic. However, it should be not too 
high from the average, so we believe the 6M represents the 
highest traffic on this traffic pattern. The testing is on the 
first traffic pattern mimicking the real traffic on Telkom ISP 
user. This testing will try to use 2 attackers. We called this 
traffic pattern as Traffic A. 
B. Scenario 2 
In this scenario, previous method and improvement 
method will be tested to detect attack traffic with the flat 
condition. The attacker sends 20M, and the maximum 
legitimate traffic set to 9M. We choose the 9M value from 
the highest traffic value 8M added by 1M, just in case if 
there is an increase in traffic that exceeds the maximum 
traffic. However, it should be not too high from the average, 
so we believe the 6M represents the highest traffic on this 
traffic pattern. The testing is on the first traffic pattern 
mimicking the real traffic. This testing will try to use 2 
attackers. We called this traffic pattern as Traffic B.  
On implementing experiment scenario, there are three 
main steps such as creates Mininet simulator environment 
where all simulation get a place, run controller with 
detection method in it, and run Iperf to generate IP traffic. 
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C. Experiment Result of Scenario 1 
In this scenario, the real traffic data of Telkom Corp. is 
used, by mimicking them with traffic generator, first let the 
traffic generator run based on mimicking data traffic that 
represents active user traffic. In Fig. 9, at second 208, there 
is injected UDP traffic as an attack. Every second, the 
controller will pool 60 values to the array and calculate the 
mean and the 6sigma of it. The controller will always 
calculate this value and will compare the next value of traffic 
with the mean and Six-Sigma. 
The Mean of 60 pool of traffic from second 147 to 207 is 
1.49, the sigma value of the 60 pool traffic is 1.06. The 
traffic at second 208 is 20m as attack traffic; when it is 
subtracted from the mean, the value is above the threshold of 
both Six-Sigma and three-sigma. It is detected as an attack. 
It used the real traffic data of Telkom Indonesia Corp., by 
mimicking them with traffic generator. First, we let the 
traffic generator run based on mimicking data traffic as 
active user traffic. In Fig. 10, at second 208, we inject the 
UDP traffic as legitimate. Every second, the controller will 
pool 60 values to the array and calculate the mean and the 
6sigma of it. The controller will always calculate this value 
and will compare the next value of traffic with the mean and 
Six-Sigma. 
D. Experiment Result of Scenario 2 
We use the real traffic data, by mimicking them with 
traffic generator. First, we let the traffic generator run based 
on mimicking data traffic as infrequent user traffic, we want 
to know is the three-sigma, or Six-Sigma can detect an 
attack on the flat tendencies traffic.  
In Fig. 11 at second 208, we inject the UDP traffic as 
Attack. Every second, the controller will pool 60 values to 
the array and calculate the mean and the 6sigma of it. The 
controller will always calculate this value and will compare 
the next value of traffic with the mean and Six-Sigma. 
 
 
 
Fig. 9  20M traffic injected on second 208 
 
 
 
Fig. 10  6M legitimate traffic on second 208 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 11  20M traffic injected on second 162 
 
The Mean of 60 pool of traffic from second 103 to 162 is 
3.51, the sigma value of the 60 pool traffic is 1.73. The 
traffic at second 163 is 20m as attack traffic when it is 
subtracted from the mean; the value is above the threshold of 
both Six-Sigma and three-sigma. It is detected as an attack. 
We use the real traffic data, by mimicking them with 
traffic generator. First, we let the traffic generator run based 
on mimicking data traffic as infrequent user traffic. In Fig. 
12, at second 208, we inject the UDP traffic as legitimate. 
Every second, the controller will pool 60 values to the array 
and calculate the mean and the 6sigma of it. The controller 
will always calculate this value and will compare the next 
value of traffic with the mean and Six-Sigma. 
E. Data Presentation and Analysis 
The Mean of 60 pool of traffic from second 147 to 207 is 
1.49 while the sigma value of the 60 pool traffic is 1.06. The 
traffic at second 208 is 6M as legitimate traffic when it is 
subtracted from the mean, the value of last traffic is above 
the threshold of three-sigma, and it is detected as an attack. 
However, otherwise, it bellows the Six-Sigma threshold, so 
it is not detected as an attack. To understand this we will see 
Table 2, the difference value of the last traffic value and the 
mean present by (Q1-M) column, the 3sigma or 6sigma 
present by (sigma 60) column. Those values are compared. 
If the values of the (Q1-M) are bigger than the Sigma (60), it 
categorized as DDoS. 
The Mean of 60 pool of traffic from second 103 to 162 is 
3.51 while the sigma value of the 60 pool traffic is 1.73. The 
traffic at second 208 is 9m as legitimate traffic when it is 
subtracted from the mean, the value of the last traffic is 
above the threshold of three-sigma, and it is detected as an 
attack. However, otherwise, it is bellowing the Six-Sigma 
threshold, so it is not detected as an attack. To understand 
this we will see Table 3, the difference value of the last 
traffic value and the mean present by (Q1-M) column, the 
3sigma or 6sigma present by (sigma 60) column. Those 
values are compared. If the value of the (Q1-M) is bigger 
than the sigma (60), it categorized as DDoS. 
 
 
 
Fig. 12  6M legitimate traffic on second 162 
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TABLE II 
COMPARISON BETWEEN TESTING SCENARIO 1 
 
Sigma Traffic Attack μ(60) Q1-μ σ (60) Result 
Previous 
Method 
(3sigma) 
20M Yes 1.49 18.51 3.19 Detected 
6M No 1.49 4.51 3.19 Detected 
Proposed 
Method  
(6sigma) 
20M Yes 1.49 18.51 6.38 Detected 
6M No 1.49 4.51 6.38 Not detected 
 
TABLE III 
COMPARISON BETWEEN TESTING SCENARIO 2 
 
Sigma Traffic Traffic Type  μ(60) 
Q1-
M 
σ 
(60) Result 
Previous 
Method 
(3sigma) 
20M Attack 3.51 16.49 5.19 Detected 
9M Normal 3.51 5.49 5.19 Detected 
Proposed 
Method 
(6sigma) 
20M Attack 3.51 16.49 10.38 Detected 
9M Normal 3.51 5/49 10.38 Not Detected 
F. Discussion and Summary Research Findings 
In the aspect of simplicity, SDN controller can be 
programmed with a high-level programming language to 
implement low-level rules forwarding hardware, to 
implement the detection mechanism; we only use 2 functions, 
for the packet statistic pooling and the detection function. In 
the traditional network, it is tough to program high-level 
programming language; it only has to use the low-level rules. 
For the detection accuracy, Table 2 and Table 3 present 
the result of a testing scenario. The result is that both three-
sigma and Six-Sigma can detect the DDoS Attack. However, 
the three-sigma also detected the legitimate traffic as 
anomaly traffic, in that scenario the three-sigma have the 
false positive rate of 50%, in the Six-Sigma they have 0% of 
false positive. It is due to the threshold that shaped by three-
sigma are too low. On the contrary, the improved Six-Sigma 
could detect the anomaly traffic and let the legitimate traffic 
not detected as an anomaly. It is due to the Six-Sigma 
shaping threshold above the three-sigma shaped threshold. 
The false positive value that we get shows an extreme 
percentage due to lack of traffic scenario; it is because the 
data traffic patterns that we get from the ISP only have 2 
types.  
 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Based on several experiments have been performed, the 
results show that the use of Six-Sigma as threshold have 
better accuracy than using three-sigma. Six-Sigma has lower 
false positive than three-sigma. It is because the three-sigma 
threshold is too low and the gap of the routine traffic is too 
narrow, so when there is the high increase of traffic, it will 
be detected as an attack. The Six-Sigma otherwise, shows 
much of gap for the legitimate traffic to expand and not 
detected as an attack. The results show the proposed method 
could improve the accuracy of DDoS attack detection on 
SDN environment, either in constant or fluctuating traffic, 
by reducing the false positive. The performance is about 50% 
more accurate than the previous method. 
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